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OUR BURDEN OF BURDENS
LLOYD L. wIEHm*
Judge Lloyd L. Wiehl critically examines the different standards
utiliced by the Washington Supreme Court to measure and describe
the burden of proof in civil cases. He concludes that the present formu-
las should be converted into standards based on the probability theory.
An essential requirement for the determination of any judicial action
is the existence of clear and comprehensible standards for describing
and measuring the burden of proof. In criminal actions, the burden
of proving a case "beyond a reasonable doubt" appears to be the
best and only standard. In civil cases, however, standards utilized
to measure and describe the burden of proof have proliferated to
such an extent that they detract from rather than contribute to clarity
and understanding.
Recently, the author heard a civil case in which three different
standards or formulas were applicable in determining the burden of
proof. The fact that such a paradox existed had never been illustrated
so forcefully. This case happened to be non-jury but the same stand-
ards would apply in a jury case, and, of course, the jury in that
event would have to be told in clear and understandable language
about these different measures of persuasion.
The Washington Supreme Court has developed many different
standards to measure and describe the burden of persuasion in civil
cases. Five of these standards are: (1) proof by "a preponderance
of the evidence"; (2) proof by "clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence"; (3) proof to a "reasonable certainty"; (4) proof by "clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence"; and (5) proof by evidence that
is "conclusive, definite, certain and beyond all legitimate controversy."
This multiplication of standards is not unique to Washington.
Courts throughout the land are engaging in a flight of abstract legal-
istic verbosity which promises to end only when they run out of
new adjectives. It is truly a flight into a land of fantasy since
neither lawyer nor layman has any idea of the fine and shadowy
distinctions, if any, between all of the adjectives used to describe or
define the burden of persuasion. In the area of fraud alone, the
courts of the country have come up with no less than forty different
* Judge of the Superior Court, Yaldma County, Washington.
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combinations of adjectives to describe what they believe to be the
burden of proof.'
Since different factual situations evidently require different stand-
ards of proof or measures of persuasion, it is absolutely essential that
the finder of fact, whether judge or jury, know and understand the
particular measure involved in the case. If trial is by jury, it is
of course the duty of the judge to instruct to that end. This has
proven unsuccessful. Controlled tests and questionnaires have shown
that a jury has little conception of the meaning of the present burden
of proof in civil cases.2
The purpose of this article is to examine the usefulness of the
five standards of proof listed above. Each measure of persuasion
will be analyzed separately and definite suggestions made as to whether
the measure should be eliminated or couched in more understandable
language.
I. PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
The "reasonable doubt" standard used in criminal cases points
to what we are really concerned with-a state of the trier's mind.
However, the traditional standard used in civil cases-by "a pre-
ponderance of the evidence"-is a step removed since it refers to
an amount of evidence and is merely the instrument by which the
juror's mind is influenced. It is therefore an awkward vehicle for
expressing the degree of the juror's belief.' In most jurisdictions,
the expression has been interpreted as meaning that proof which leads
the finder of fact to find that the existence of a contested fact is
more "probably" or more "likely" true than not true.' By utilizing a
' See 24 AM. JuR., Fraud and Deceit § 278 (1939), wherein the author remarked:
The variety in the various expressions above noted which purport to state the
degree of proof necessary to establish fraud renders them far from satisfactory in
establishing any workable rule.
2 See Hagman & MacArthur, Evidence: The Validity of Multiple Standards of
Proof, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 525; Remarks of Hon. Walter B. Wanamaker, Trial by
Jury, 11 U. CiNc. L. REV. 119, 191-200 (1937) ; Report of Committee on Adninistra-
tion of Jiistice, Wis. B. Bull., June 1952, p. 25-28.
3 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 676 (1954).
4 The Washington court has reduced the burden to the probability factor. See, e.g.,
Kilmer v. Bean, 48 Wn. 2d 848, 851-52, 296 P.2d 992, 994 (1956); Cambro Co. v.
Snook, 43 Wn. 2d 609, 615, 262 P.2d 767, 771 (1953) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co, 18 Wn. 2d 798, 803, 140 P.2d 507, 509 (1943). Accord, Cook v. Michael, 214
Ore. 513, 330 P2d 1026 (1958); MATHES & DEvITT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 71.01 (1965); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVlI. 116
(1961); MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (Cim) 42 (1963). See also MORGAN,
SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 84-85 (1956) ; Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability
Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 51 (1961) ; McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242 (1944) ; Roberts & Sinrich, Variable
Verbalistics, 11 VAxD. L. REV. 1413 (1958).
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standard framed in terms of probability rather than preponderance
of the evidence, the intention of the finder of fact will be more
properly focused on his own impressions and state of mind rather than
upon the evidence in the case.5 This should be more understandable to
the average juror since his own everyday decision-making processes are
usually in terms of probabilities. In addition, by means of the probabil-
ity theory, any conflict over the meaning of the word "preponderance"
and any argument over the amount of the preponderance required will
be avoided.6 It is the recommendation of this writer that the "perpon-
derance of the evidence" formula be converted in all applicable cases
into the "more probably true than not" standard-a standard based on
the probability theory.7
II. PROOF BY "CLEAR, COGENT, AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE"
The second standard used-that a certain fact must be proved by
"clear, cogent and convincing evidence" or by "clear and convincing
evidence,"--is often presented to the trier of fact in fraud cases
and in cases where a party must rebut a strong presumption.' The
Washington Supreme Court has decreed that the jury must be advised
that the three magic words mean more than a "preponderance of
the evidence. ' 10 This kind of formula is even more objectionable than
5 See Roberts & Sinrich, supra note 4.
6 See Ball, supra note 4, at 808, in which Professor Ball discusses the communication
muddle over the meaning of "preponderance."
7This has been done by the Washington Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instruc-
tions (WPI), yet to be published, by its pattern instruction No. 21.01, as follows:
When it is said that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or that
any proposition must be proved by a "preponderance" of a "fair preponderance of
the evidence," or the expressions "if you find" or "if you decide" are used, it means
that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the
proposition on which he has the burden of proof is more probably true than not
true.
8 There seems to be no difference in the two ways of describing this formula since
"cogent" is a synonym of "convincing," and it seems to be purely a matter of semantics.
It is also interesting to note that, while "cogent' by definition means "convincing, the
word "clear" by common understanding also means "convincing," and therefore it is
hard for an attorney, let alone a layman, to recognize any difference in the meaning
of the three words. It is also true that a widely accepted definition is that evidence
"preponderates" when it is more "convincing" to the trier than the opposing evidence.
See State v. Amunsis, 61 Wn. 2d 160, 377 P2d 462 (1963); McComsicK, EVIDENCE
677 (1954). Therefore, it could well be argued that the use of the adjectives add little,
if anything, to the traditional standard in a civil case.
0 See Dizard & Getty v. Damson, 63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964) (presumption
that a husband as manager of the community property incurs a community debt must
be rebutted by "clear and convincing" evidence); Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wn. 2d 150, 385
P.2d 727 (1963) (fraud case) ; Holmes v. Raffo, 60 Wn. 2d 421, 374 P.2d 536 (1962)
(emancipation of a minor child must be proved by evidence that is "clear, cogent and
convincing.) ; King v. Prudential Ins. Co., 13 Wn. 2d 414, 125 P.2d 282 (1942) (pre-
sumption of gratuity which attaches to the work a child does for his father must be
overcome by "clear and convincing" evidence).
10 See Holmes v. Raffo, supra note 9.
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the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, since the trier of fact
is left without any measuring device whatsoever. As stated by Pro-
fessor McCormick, "no high degree of precision can be attained by
these groups of adjectives."" And, as stated in a prior article by
this author, 2 the use of such adjectives is not necessarily inconsistent
with the use of the traditional "preponderance of the evidence" stand-
ard. The words "clear," "cogent" and "convincing" used separately
or in groups are nothing but adjectives, and an adjective is nothing
more or less than a word used with a noun to denote a quality
of the thing named. Thus, it may well be argued, and has in fact
been held, that such a group of adjectives denotes the quality of
the evidence required to reach a certain verdict and does not neces-
sarily denote the quantum of the evidence.'3 Some courts, however,
have held that this group of adjectives means "beyond a reasonable
doubt.""' Professor McBaine has suggested that the use of these
adjectives could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the
jury if the jurors were instructed that they must be persuaded that
the truth of the contention is "highly probable."' This is now the
rule in Oregon. 6 By utilizing Professor McBaine's suggestion, the
trier would again be dealing in probabilities and would be expressing
the trier's belief and not merely discussing the quality of the evi-
dence which is required to form that belief. This is an understand-
able measure.
In Bland v. Mentor," the Washington court states that the phrase
"clear, cogent and convincing evidence" denotes not only more than
a mere preponderance of the evidence but less than "beyond a reason-
" McCoRmiuc, EVIDENCE 679 (1954).
12 Wiehl, Instructing a Jury in Washington, 36 WASH. L. Rsv. 378 (1961).
13 Ray v. Nanney, 21 Tenn. App. 618, 114 S.W2d 51 (1938). See Speiss v. Brandt,
230 Minn. 246, 41 N.W.2d 561 (1950); WiscoNsiN JuRy INsTRuCTIONS (CIVn), Part
1, forms 200-11 (1960), in which, on authority of Wisconsin decisions, it is provided
that the usual burden of proof in a civil case is to satisfy to a "reasonable certainty,"
but in those cases, such as fraud cases, where a greater or "middle" burden is needed,
then the jury is told: "Such burden as to each question is to satisfy or convince you
to a reasonable certainty, by evidence that is dear, satisfactory, and convincing, that
." In other words, in Wisconsin the quantum does not change; only the quality
changes.
"4 Greene v. Bride & Son Constr. Co., 252 Iowa 220, 106 N.W2d 603 (1960) ; Karr
v. Pearl, 212 Ky. 387, 279 S.W. 631 (1926).
I5 McBaine, supra note 4 at 246-47, 253-54. Professor McBaine cogently suggests
that the formulas used for criminal and civil matters, that is, "beyond a reasonable
doubt," "by clear, cogent and convincing evidence" and "by preponderance of the evi-
dence' are equivalent to statements that the trier must find that the fact is (a) almost
certainly true, (b) highly probably true, and (c) probably true.
16 Supove v. Densmoor, 225 Ore. 365, 358 P.2d 510 (1960) ; Cook v. Michael, 214
Ore. 513, 330 P2d 1026, 1032 (1958).
17 63 Wn. 2d 150, 385 P2d 727 (1963).
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able doubt." This is the same indefinite standard suggested by the
Uniform Rules of Evidence18 and by the New Jersey court in Aiello
v. Knoll Golf Club," where the court said that the use of this group
of adjectives "establishes a standard of proof falling somewhere be-
tween the ordinary civil and criminal standards."" The trier of fact
is, therefore, told what these adjectives do not mean but is never
told what they do mean. Another defect of the "clear, cogent and
convincing" formula is that the trier of fact may well be faced with
a situation where the evidence, both for and against a contested
fact, will be of a quality suggested by the group of adjectives. If
this occurs, the trier could well start wondering which side of the
case is the clearer or the more cogent or the more convincing. The
trier of fact would then be confronted with the confusing task of
evaluating comparative degrees of the adjectives.
Jurors, if not the trial court, must be given a more satisfactory
measuring device. If the courts cannot agree on the meaning of
such a group of adjectives, how can a jury of laymen understand
what is being said? In fact, jurors do not understand.2 If it is
concluded that the adjectives merely express the quality of the evi-
dence required (and that is the purpose of an adjective), then it
must be further concluded that the resolution of a contested fact
may still be decided by what is more probably true than not true.
However, if a court feels that a heavier burden is required (and
certainly this is the holding of the Washington court), then it should
adopt the "highly probable" test which is the rule in Oregon.22 By
putting the measurement in these terms a court would be exacting
a higher standard than that required by the "more probably true
than not true" formula discussed previously and at the same time
would be presenting the trier of fact with a comprehensible measure-
ment directed toward his belief rather than toward the evidence. In
addition, uniformity between the two measurements would exi.t.
III. PROOF TO A "REASONABLE CERTAINTY"
The third formula requires that a fact be proved to a "reasonable
certainty." This standard is apparently used by the Washington
Is Rule 1(4).
19 64 N.J. Super. 156, 165 A2d 531 (1960).2 0 Accord, Cross v. Legford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954); Child v.
Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958).
21 See Hagman & MacArthur, supra note 2.
22 See Supove v. Densmoor, 225 Ore. 365, 358 P2d 510 (1960), in which the Oregon
court said: "Clear and convincing evidence means that the truth of the facts asserted
is highly probable." (Emphasis added.)
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Supreme Court in describing the burden of proof regarding future
or prospective damages. Although this formula appears from a pre-
liminary reading of the cases to be a third and separate measure-
ment of the burden of proof, a closer examination of the cases indi-
cates that as a standard it requires nothing more than the traditional
"preponderance of the evidence" measurement and should therefore
be discarded as a separate and distinct statement of the measurement
of proof.
The Washington court, since 190423 has held almost uniformly that
the phrases "reasonably certain" or "to a reasonable certainty" were
not needed in instructions relating to future damages and that when
such phrases were used they were to be interpreted as meaning by
a "preponderance of the evidence" or "reasonably probable" since
the burden of proof for future damages was the same as for past
damages.2"
However, in Taylor v. Lubetich,25 the court appears to have deviated
from the Gallamore line by requiring the "reasonably certain" burden.
But Taylor should not be considered as authority in the matter
since the court was merely passing on the sufficiency of the evidence
and not upon the necessity of the words "reasonable certainty" in
a jury instruction. In the next case, Orme v. Watkins,26 the court
seems to approve an instruction on future damages including the
phrase "reasonably certain." However, the instruction was not ex-
cepted to and the court therefore was merely passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the instruction. The Orme rule
was followed in Venske v. Johnson-Lieber Co.,2" in which the court
stated that the trial court erred in giving an instruction which per-
mitted the jury to speculate as to what future medical expenses
"might" be incurred and held that such damages must be proved
23 Gallamore v. City of Olympia, 34 Wash. 379, 75 Pac. 978 (1904) ; Webster v. City
of Seattle, Renton Ry. Co., 42 Wash. 364, 85 Pac. 2 (1906) ; Rowe v. Whatcom Co. R.
& Light Co., 44 Wash. 658, 87 Pac. 921 (1906) ; Harris v. Brown's Bay Logging Co.,
57 Wash. 8, 106 Pac. 152 (1910); McIlwaine v. Tacoma R. & Power Co., 72 Wash.
184, 129 Pac. 1093 (1913) ; Holt v. School Dist. No. 71, 102 Wash. 442, 173 Pac. 335
(1918) ; Kane v. Nakamoto, 113 Wash. 476, 194 Pac. 381 (1920) ; Johnson v. Dye, 131
Wash. 637, 230 Pac. 625 (1924). But cf., Ongaro v. Twohy, 49 Wash. 93, 94 Pac. 916(1908).
24 For a general discussion of cases from this jurisdiction and others, see Annot.,
85 A.L.R. 1010, 1019 (1933) ; 81 A.L.R. 423, 467 (1932).
252 Wn. 2d 6, 97 P.2d 142 (1939).
2644 Wn. 2d 325, 267 P.2d 681 (1954).
2747 Wn. 2d 511, 288 P.2d 249 (1955). For eases applying "reasonable certainty"
doctrine to prospective business profits, see Ingersol v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 63
Wn. 2d 354, 387 P.2d 538 (1963) ; Hole v. Unity Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn. 2d 416, 131
P.2d 150 (1942).
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with reasonable certainty, citing Taylor as authority. It must be
noted that in Venske the court, while not passing squarely on the
matter, appears to indicate or suggest a change from the Gallamore
line.
However, since Johnson v. Dye has never been overruled, and
since it is the last case in which the court passed squarely on the
proposition, it seems that the words "reasonable certainty" should
not be required. Therefore, the phrase "reasonable certainty," born
of accidental surplusage and transition, should be discarded.
It may be argued, however, that the "reasonable certainty" re-
quirement, while not changing the traditional burden of proof in a
civil case, is an added epithet thrown in to insure against speculation
and conjecture. But this could be prevented by specifically admon-
ishing the jury not to base a verdict for damages on speculation
and conjecture, without changing the usual standard of proof. All
of this confusion should therefore be eliminated by simply instructing
the jury that future damages must be proved by the same burden
of proof as all other damages, plus specifically admonishing against
speculation and conjecture.
IV. PROOF BY "CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND DECISIVE EVIDENCE"
This standard was apparently first adopted by the Washington
court in Tuschoff v. Westover," in which the court held that the
burden of proof, upon one who sets up abandonment of a lease as
a defense, is to prove the same by "clear, unequivocal and decisive
evidence."
The Washington court further held that, as in the case of "clear,
cogent and convincing evidence," a general instruction stating the
correct rule as to the quality of the evidence cannot cure the error
of applying the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, citing
Adjustment Dep't, Olympia Credit Bureau v. Smedegard.9 It might
be argued that the standard applied in Tuschoff is the same as the
"clear, cogent and convincing" standard. While it may be admitted
that this new standard lies somewhere in between "preponderance
of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt," nevertheless, it
cannot be said to be the same as "clear, cogent and convincing,"
or else the court would have said so, especially in view of its citation
of Smedegard. Also, it has been held that "clear and convincing"
28 65 Wn. 2d 69, 395 P,2d 630 (1964).
20 40 Wn. 2d 76, 241 P.2d 203 (1952).
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does not mean "clear and unequivocal."3 While a judge or jury
might reasonably conclude that the phrase means the same as "be-
yond a reasonable doubt,"" nevertheless, that is evidently not what
the Washington court meant; at least it did not say so. It must
therefore be assumed that this new burden is another classic exam-
ple of the use of a floating standard providing little assistance to
the court or jury in the trial of a case. Much of what has been
said in section (2), dealing with "clear, cogent and convincing" evi-
dence, applies to this conglomeration of adjectives, which again deals
only with the quality of the evidence, but evidently denotes a heavier
burden than by a "preponderance of the evidence," and perhaps not
as heavy as proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Again, it must be
said that we are dealing in abstract legal verbosities and certainly
cannot expect a jury of laymen to understand the shadowy distinc-
tions between these adjectives. If this floating burden must be retained,
then it should be described in terms of probabilities; in other words,
"highly probable." The jury could hopefully understand that stand-
ard, and it would again promote uniformity.
V. PROOF BY EVIDENCE THAT IS "CONCLUSIVE, DEFINITE, CERTAIN,
AND BEYOND ALL LEGITIMATE CONTROVERSY"
In Bicknell v. Guenther,2 the court, relying strongly on Jennings
v. D'Hooghe,3 held that the existence of an oral contract to devise
or bequeath property must be proven by evidence that is "con-
clusive, definite, certain, and beyond all legitimate controversy." In
Jennings, the court reviewed all cases to date and concluded that
the above-stated standard was firmly adhered to in every case except
two,"' where the "reasonable certainty" standard was used. In try-
ing to locate the exact measure of proof intended by the Washington
court, it is interesting to note that in Jennings the court in discussing
the sufficiency of the evidence in two prior cases, said: "In fact,
the evidence there would have been sufficient to prove guilt in a
criminal case.""5 The court therefore indicates that it is talking about
30 Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E2d 118, 123 (1954), in which the
Supreme Court of Ohio, in speaking of "dear and convincing" evidence, said: "It does
not mean clear and unequivocal."
31 "Unequivocal" means "without doubt," and "decisive' means "conclusive." Win-
STER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTMONARY (2d ed. 1948).
82 65 Wn. 2d 749, 399 P2d 598 (1965).
33 25 Wn. 2d 702, 172 P.2d 189 (1946).34 Avenetti v. Brown, 158 Wash. 517, 291 Pac. 469 (1930) ; Herren v. Herren, 118
Wash. 56, 203 Pac. 34 (1921).
35 25 Wn. 2d at 724, 172 P.2d at 200.
[VOL. 41 :109
OUR BURDEN OF BURDENS
a quantum of evidence less than "beyond a reasonable doubt." One
might wonder at such a statement since the use of the word "con-
clusive" in the epithet indicates a burden even greater than "beyond
a reasonable doubt." Certainly, the court meant a burden heavier
than imposed by the "reasonable certainty" or the "dear, cogent
and convincing" standards previously discussed. Judge Finley's strong
dissent in Bicknell, concurred in by Judge Hamilton, sharply attacks
the Jennings rule. His attack centers on the apparent absolute cer-
tainty required by the standard and also on its indefiniteness. He
states that the term "beyond a legitimate controversy" is the "ulti-
mate in legal abstractions," and suggests the "clear, cogent and con-
vincing" standard, which, according to his research, is the obvious
and popular alternate.3 In any event, it must be agreed that this
constant proliferation of burdens must stop somewhere or we will
end up with a different burden for every conceivable type of case,
with so many shadowy distinctions that it will become impossible
to intelligently instruct a jury. It therefore is recommended that
this standard be converted into an understandable measure, such as
that which is "highly probable" or is to be found "beyond a reason-
able doubt." The "highly probable" measure would seem to be pref-
erable from the standpoint of uniformity. It should also be sufficient
to insure against speculation or conjecture. In addition, as has been
stated previously, such a standard would be articulated in terms of
the jurors' belief in the existence or non-existence of the disputed
fact, which, after all, is the kind of measuring device we are really
looking for. We are certainly not seeking the jury's estimate of the
weight of evidence in the abstract, apart from its powers of per-
suasion.' 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, it has been demonstrated that there is considerable
basis for the present-day criticism of our multiple standards of proof.
From the standpoint not only of arriving at a more precise standard
but also of communicating it to a jury, we should attack this prob-
lem with renewed determination. The suggested solution is that the
five standards presently used in civil cases be converted into only
two degrees of probability, that which is "more probably true than
not true" and that which is "highly probable." If it is concluded
36 65 Wn. 2d at 765-66, 399 P2d at 607-08.37 See James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 53-54 (1961).
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that an epithet is needed as a caution to the jury, then it should
be converted into the probability standard, such as has been done
by the Washington Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
in its handling of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard."
This may be done by an instruction reading substantially as follows:
When it is said that a party has the burden of proving any proposi-
tion by [clear, cogent and convincing evidence] [or any other epi-
thet] it means that you must be persuaded, considering all the
evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has the
burden of proof is highly probable.
On the other hand, if it is concluded that an epithet is not needed,
then an instruction could be worded in the following manner:
One who claims [fraud] [ ] has a burden of proof greater
than persuading you that its existence is more probably true than
not true. He has the burden of persuading you that its existence
is highly probable.
The latter instruction is preferred since, generally speaking, epithets
are confusing and ambiguous. Also, the latter instruction can con-
veniently be used in conjunction with the ordinary burden of proof
by simply preceding it with the word "However." In most cases
both standards will be needed. If another and more onerous burden
is desired, then we should go to the present standard used in criminal
cases, "beyond a reasonable doubt." In this manner, we achieve not
only uniformity but also improved communication with the jury.
Instructions phrased in terms of probability, being in degrees of
belief, are clear, understandable and, above all, accurate. Courts
should also terminate the questionable habit of inventing new abstract
standards or epithets to add to our already intolerable "burden of
burdens."
38 For text of pattern instruction, see supra note 7.
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